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Abstract

Nine years after deregulation became policy in commercial
radio broadcasting, a study of the effects of the provision in
the deregulatory position the Federal Communications Ccmnission
took in 1981 which eliminated any restrictions on the amount
of commercial time a station could air in a given hour was conducted
on 13 radio stations in five Nebraska markets.
Because the logging requirements to which broadcasters had
to adhere were eliminated with deregulation, the data in this
survey was collected by tape recording, then analyzing by 195
hours of actual radio broadcasts.

Of the 13 stations surveyed

during the peak hours of the day (drive times), the peak days
of the week (Wednesday through Friday) and at different times
of the year, two stations, both in small, non-ccmpetitive markets
were found to have exceeded the previous limit of 18 minutes
per hour.
The research found that the foundation of the marketplace
model, upon which deregulation is based, is potentially flawed
when projected on those markets which are not served by multiple
radio properties.

Further, the research advocates the direct

methodology of monitoring not only the effects of deregulation
on overcommercialization, but on any monitoring research conducted
on broadcast content because the researcher has much more control
over the data collection process.

Finally, the research is meant

to stimulate more study of the effects of deregulation, particularly
on the pervasive medium of radio.
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Deregulation
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Introduction

Economic regulation is imposed because of perceived flaws
in the operation of competition in a particular market.
(Gellhom and Pierce, 1982, p. 21)
For almost 50 years the nation's airwaves were regulated
chiefly under the guidelines of a single instrument, the
Communications Act of 1934, and the federal agency created by
this act and mandated by Congress to insure compliance, the Federal
Communications Commission.

In April of 1981, a new era in radio

broadcasting began, the age of deregulation.
It has been nine years since deregulation has been a fait
accompli.

Where is the industry today?

In what was the most

comprehensive change in regulatory authority of the radio broadcast
industry since 1934, deregulation was to have changed the very
nature of what the public was to expect from the licensees of
the now more than 10,000 radio stations in existence in the United
States.

Has it?

And more importantly, what mechanisms are in

place to monitor the state of radio broadcasting and its obligations
to serve the populace?
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Historical Perspective: 1912-1981

To understand the development of deregulation in the
communications industry of the United States, it is essential
to understand the history of regulation.

Tunstall (1986) sets

the stage for this discussion:
Deregulation is as many sided a phenomenon as regulation.
Since the Interstate Commerce Commission took on the
regulation of the railroad natural monopoly in the 1880's,
Congress has entrusted to a variety of federal agencies
the regulation of various industries.

The range of industries

has been vast, and the dangers to be protected against have
also been numerous, (p. 22)
The first attempt in the United States toward regulation
of radio was The Act to Regulate Radio Communication, passed
on August 13, 1912 (Davis, 1929).

It was originally written

to "encourage the development of the radiotelephone art" (as
cited in Davis, 1929, p.48), and the licensing of stations fell
to the Secretary of Ccmnerce.

The Radio Act of 1912, as it is

usually referred to, was the first domestic law for the general
control of radio (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 10).

This initial attempt

at regulation of the radio led to chaos.

Stations were signing

on the air with little or no forethought and

interference between

stations was dramatic, with the net effect of the radio listener
being bombarded with a cacophony of often indiscernible noise
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(e.g. see Davis, 1929, Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 213-214).
The Act was proven to be an ineffective way to deal with
regulation as court decisions held that the Secretary of Conmerce
had no power to limit power of stations, broadcast time or licenses
themselves (e.g. United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation (1926);
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Company (1923); and Chicago Tribune
v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station (1926)) (Ginsburg, 1979, p.
10, and Davis, 1929, p. 32).
Finally, Congress deemed the 1912 statute inadequate for
the growing industry, and determined the only way the situation
could be dealt with was to limit the number of licenses, since
the listening public

could

best be served with fewer stations

and a minimum amount of interference (Davis, 1929).
The result of the efforts of Congress was An Act for the
Regulation of Radio Communications and for Other Purposes, approved
by the President of the United States on February 27, 1927.
This Radio Act of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission,
and empowered the Commission to classify radio stations, "prescribe
the nature of service to be rendered by each class of licensed
stations," and to assign "bands of frequency to the classes of
radio stations and individual stations" as well as determine
the power and times they could operate.

Furthermore, they were

to do so as "public convenience, interest or necessity requires"
(as cited in Davis, 1929; Kahn, 1984).

This standard of public

interest, convenience or necessity is a construct whose exact
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definition is vehemently debated to this day, and will be discussed
later in this paper.

At the time of the signing of the Act,

732 broadcast stations were in operation.

The new regulations

caused some 150 to surrender their licenses (Ginsburg, 1979).
As the United States entered the decade of the 1930's, a
new era of regulation was about to begin.

According to Tunstall

(1986):
Regulation has also tended to ebb and flow, giving each
decade its particular regulatory character.

The 1930's,

for instance, saw the setting up of regulatory agencies
which reflected such New Deal concerns as stabilizing prices.
The FCC, established in 1934, and other agencies
of this era were given significant independence and rather
vague terms of reference. (22)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created
by The Communications Act of 1934 and was the product of an
interdepartmental committee appointed by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to study electronic communication.

The purpose of

the Act was to regulate all "interstate and foreign communication
by wire and radio" (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 11) and, just as the Radio
Act of 1927 which it replaced, it was to provide for the
"administrative allocation of the spectrum and licensure of would-be
broadcast users" (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 36).

Further, the FCC

was to ensure that licensees strictly adhered to rules and
X
regulations under threat of revocation or imposition of forfeiture
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of up to $20,000 (LeDuc, 1987).
LeDuc addresses the breadth of these regulations:
The FCC compelled each applicant seeking a broadcast license
to establish not only its technical, legal, and financial
qualifications to operate a station in the public interest,
but also its commitment, as evidenced by its programming
proposal, to serve specific local-audience needs that its
community surveys had isolated and defined. (5)
LeDuc's analysis clearly shows how the 1934 Act embodied the
standard of public "interest, convenience and necessity" first
outlined in the Radio Act of 1927.
In real terms, the Acts of 1927 and 1934 were nearly the
same, with terminology and minor administrative details the only
changes of significance (especially Sections 316 and 325 covering
the prohibition of lotteries and those who maintained studios
for the development of programming to foreign stations which
could be heard in the United States).

While there were subsequent

amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, it remained reasonably
intact for nearly fifty years (Coase, 1959, and LeDuc, 1987).
Tunstall (1986) states that deregulation began in
communications earlier than in the other industries:
It really began with the 1968 Supreme Court 1Carterfone1
decision which permitted non-AT&T telephones and customer
equipment to be connected to the AT&T system.
MCI won its original FCC permission to

And in 1969

hook into the AT&T
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system.

But despite these 1968-69 competitive beginnings,

communications deregulation took well over a decade to arrive
even partially. (24)
Deregulation of the radio broadcast industry began in earnest
during the Carter administration.

The Comiunications Subcommittee

chaired by California House Democrat Lionel Van Deerlin, shortly
after Carter was inaugurated, set out to, as Tunstall (1986)
describes it, "comprehensively rewrite the charter Communications
Act of 1934" (29).

Further, after years of resisting deregulatory

efforts, the FCC began "wholeheartedly pursuing deregulation"
(Tunstall, 1986, p. 29).
In 1979, the FCC, then chaired by Commissioner Charles Ferris,
issued "In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry
and Proposed Rulemaking" (1979):
We are today initiating a proceeding looking toward the
substantial deregulation of commercial broadcast radio.
The Commission is proposing rule and policy changes that
would remove current requirement s in nontechnical areas
including nonentertainment programming, ascertainment, and
commercialization.

This represents a clear departure from

our present involvement in such matters and we therefore
solicit comments on the proposed changes. (457)
Less than eighteen months later, the FCC, still under the
chairmanship of Charles Ferris, adopted and released "In the
Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding
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Terminated)" (1981), which opened:
Today, having received and analyzed the numerous comments,
and having held panel discussions at which the questions
raised by this proceeding were energetically debated, we
are prepared to resolve the issues.

We believe that our

resolution of those issues assures that service in the public
interest will continue without unnecessarily burdensome
regulations of uniform applicability that fail to take into
account local conditions, tastes or desires. (968-69)
In the "Report and Order", the FCC took action in four

|q

principal subject areas: nonentertainment programming guidelines;
ascertainments; canmercial guidelines; and program logs.

What

\

this meant was that broadcasters now only had a general obligation
to offer programming responsive to public issues and could focus
upon those issues of concern to their individual audiences rather ^
p

than to the community as a whole.

Further, formal ascertainment

(

guidelines were eliminated, and broadcasters could use any
reasonable means they wished to determine issues facing their
audiences.

Canmercial guidelines were eliminated.

No longer

was there an eighteen-minute-per-hour maximum on the total number
of commercial minutes; this was now to be determined by the
marketplace.

Finally, programming logging requirements were

eliminated.

Stations now were required to keep only an annual

listing of five to ten issues (and examples of programs they
aired to respond to those issues) covered by the licensee in

^
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their public file (971).
After 50 years of regulation predicated

on the general

standard of public "interest, convenience or necessity," a new
era had dawned.

Like much of the previously heavily regulated

American industrial environment, radio broadcasting had entered
the age of deregulation, or at least, reregulation.
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Competing Models

The literature concerning the deregulation of the broadcast
industry is best characterized by the construct of two competing
models or paradigms.

The first is the public trusteeship model*1

as conceived by the previously discussed Radio Act of 1927 and,
ultimately, the Ccmmunications Act of 1934. The second is the
marketplace model, embodied by the "Report and Order" in 1981,
and upon which the current notion of deregulation was built.
To best analyze these competing paradigms it would be
beneficial to break them down to those elements most contradictory.
Bonder (1984) articulates two competing notions which will serve
this review of literature most effectively:
Allocation through the licensing process and content regulation
seems to have emerged from this analysis as two distinct
spheres of broadcast regulation.

As such they are more

often than not thought of as separate, independent variables
within the broadcasting regulatory framework, with regulatory
determinations as to one having but marginal implications
for appropriate regulatory determinations as to the other.
(27-28)
It is the intent of the following to detail the arguments by
each school of thought in relation to these "two distinct spheres
of broadcast regulation," and to assess whether they can truly
be considered independently.
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In what became a judicial review of the regulatory authority
of the FCC,

the National Broadcasting Company v. the United

States (1943)/ Justice Frankfurter stated:
The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate
all who wish to use them.

Methods must be devised for choosing

from among the many who apply.

And since Congress itself

could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission!.!
The Commission
this duty.

was, however, not left at large in performing

The touchstone provided by Congress was the

"public interest, convenience or necessity" (as cited in
Coase, 1959, p. 13).
The 1943 Supreme Court decision in N.B.C. v. the United States
gave broad approval to "the licensing scheme, with its inquiries
into program service" (Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 214).

This

decision complemented and further articulated a decision rendered
by the Supreme Court three years earlier in FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Company (1940), in which the Court described the
"public convenience, interest or necessity" standard as a "supple
instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy"
(as cited in Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 214).
Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the
Supreme Court

agreed on each of two notions: there was a need

for selecting licensees due to the finite nature of the radio
spectrum, and the "touchstone" was to be the public "interest,
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convenience or necessity."

Again quoting Justice Frankfurter:

The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious;
they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to
the public interest...Since the very inception of federal
regulation of radio, comparative considerations as to the
services to be rendered have governed the application of
the standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity."
(as cited in Coase, 1959, p. 13)
Proponents of the marketplace model, however, attack the
spectrum scarcity justification of the public trusteeship model
on two fronts.

First, they argue that all goods in a free market

society are scarce, be it labor, raw materials or capital (e.g.
Coase, 1959, and Fowler and Brenner, 1982).

Fowler and Brenner

(1982) elaborate:
In most sectors of the economy, the interplay of supply
and demand regulates the distribution of goods.

If a good

becomes especially scarce, its price is bid up.

Ideally

the highest bidder will make the best use of the resource.
(221)

The second argument against spectrum scarcity deals with the
rapid development of new and increasingly efficient technologies
in communications.

With the increased public and private

utilization of such information sources as cable television and
satellite communications, the marketplace of ideas and the public's
choices of where to seek out information and entertainment have
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actually changed the nature of the concept of scarcity in the
broadcast spectrum.

Fowler and Brenner (1982) argue that scarcity

is a relative concept:
Additional channels can be added without increasing the
portion reserved for broadcast, by decreasing the bandwidth
of each channel.

Technology is an independent variable

that makes scarcity a relative concept. (222)
Advocates of the public trusteeship model argue that this
new attitude toward scarcity "collides with the technical, legal,
and political grounds for maintaining previous FCC policy because
it is designed to protect the public interest in the use of public
property" (Smythe, 1982, p. 198).
being

The notion^of the airwaves

owned by the public, and the public having the proper

and legal right to expect those airwaves to be utilized by licensees
dedicated to serving the "public convenience, interest or
necessity," lies at the heart of the public trusteeship model.
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (Secretary during the initial
Radio Act of 1912) opened the fourth radio conference in 1925
with these thoughts:
The decision that the public, through the government, must
retain the ownership of the channels through the air with
just as zealous a care for open ccmpetition as we retain
public ownership of our navigation channels has given freedom
and development in

service that would have otherwise been

lost in public monopolies, (as cited in Smythe, 1982, p.

Deregulation
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198)
Content regulation is certainly the more emotional of the
two competing notions in the debate over deregulation.

Mark

Fowler (1982) stated in an address before a 1981 meeting of the
International Radio and Television Society that the most compelling
reason to do away with the trusteeship model ccmes from the First
Amendment to the Constitution:
As an agency of Congress the Federal Communications Commission
too often has violated the spirit if not the letter of this
important part of our Constitution.
.

Each time we at the

Commission insinuate our judgment into the editorial decisions
of broadcasters, each time we try to tally how fair a
documentary has been, each time we review a renewal application
for this percentage of news or that percentage of public
affairs, each time we clock the number of advertising minutes
a station carries, we trample upon the freedom that
broadcasting is guaranteed by the First Amendment. (54)
Coase (1959) states that the role of the FCC is conparable
to the following hypothetical: "The situation in the American
broadcasting industry is not essentially different in character
from that which would be found if a commission appointed by the
federal government had the task of selecting those who were to
be allowed to publish newspapers and periodicals in each city,
town and village of the United States" (7).

He further cites

Robert Hutchins, chairman of the Conmission on Freedom of the
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Press, who used the term "press" to include "all means of
communicating to the public news and opinions, emotions and beliefs,
whether by newspapers, magazines, or books, by radio broadcasts,
by television, or by films" (as cited in Coase, 1959, p. 7).
Coase also cites a seemingly contradictory view by the Court
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948):
We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and
radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment. (8)
In addition to the First Amendment question, and in response
to public trusteeship advocates who question what content the
public should expect from a free marketplace model, market advocates
argue that the open marketplace of ideas is critical to an informed
populous.

Geller (1987) argues:

The electronic mass media can make a crucial contribution
to informing the electorate on issues of public concern.
To achieve that goal, to enhance the marketplace of ideas,
we rely on widespread competition...The underlying assumption
of the First Amendment is that American people will receive
as much information as possible from diverse and antagonistic
sources, (ix)
Advocates of the public trusteeship model are just as
passionate in their argumentation.
to

There are two critical elements

which the public trusteeship proponents point.

The first

is that if left strictly to the marketplace, programming of public
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interest in such forms as news and public affairs will all but
vanish.

In an article published between the "Notice of Inquiry

and Proposed Rulemaking" and the "Report and Order," Campbell
(1980) questions the FCC's authority to deregulate.

She states

the F.C.C. has "latitude to determine policy so long as it complies
with the mandate of the Communications Act" (243).

Campbell

states that deregulation (then proposed) violated the public
interest standard of the Communications Act of 1934 in that there
would be a reduction in public affairs programming, news, service
to minorities, editorialization and a diversity in entertainment
formats.

Smythe (1982) concurs:

If this FCC Decision survives future challenges (from the
courts and the public), it appears that the public which
owns the radio frequencies will be deprived of protection
of its rights to receive radio service necessary for its
educational, social, cultural, and political welfare - rights
won in struggles in the Congress, the regulatory agency,
and the courts over more than half a century. (200)
The second front of this battle over content regulation
is more sociopolitical in nature.

Those who favor the public

trusteeship model over that of the marketplace are concerned
with putting the power of the communications industry in the
hands of the powerful, affluent few.

Ingber (1984) suggests

that the marketplace of ideas model is as flawed as the
laissez-faire economic model:
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Due to developed legal doctrine and the inevitable effects
of socialization processes, mass communication technology,
and unequal allocations of resources, ideas that support
the entrenched power structure or ideology are most likely
to gain acceptance within our current market.

Conversely

those ideas that threaten such structures or ideologies
are largely ignored in the marketplace. (17)
While the differences mentioned between the competing models
are quite distinct, it should be noted that there is one convergence
of thought.

While not overtly presented as a consensus, the

manifestation of this middle ground is a recommendation by the
marketplace model to examine the arena of public broadcasting
to serve as a hedge against the possibility of insufficient public
interest programming. Geller (1987) offers the following scenario:
The marketplace can and does achieve much, but there can
be serious deficiencies that governmental policy must recognize
and take into account...if there is a market deficiency
(such as children's programming which informs and educates)
(clarification added), as is true today, the government
should adequately support public television in order to
make such programming available, (ix)
Fowler and Brenner (1982) recommend the maintenance of public
radio and television through a spectrum fee:
A bolstered public broadcast system operating within a
marketplace approach would inject a "best use" strategy
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for most frequencies while still accommodating the nonmarket
considerations that gave rise to the reservation of spectrum
initially.

Commercial broadcasters would be absolutely

free to pursue commercial objectives without the lingering
trusteeship obligations.

At the same time noncommercial

broadcasters would have a clear mandate to provide services
as alternatives to, not duplicates of, the programming
available over commercial channels. (255)
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Survey of Empirical Research

The most outstanding characteristic of a review of pertinent
empirical research in the area of deregulation is how conspicuous
the absence of such research seems to be.
instituted the

Even as the Commission

1981 "Report and Order", it recognized the need

for a monitoring of deregulation, and in Sec. 109 outlines the
FCC's responsibilities:
The steps we are taking here in no way will reduce our
responsibility, ability, and determination to provide a
regulatory framework that assures radio broadcast programming
in the public interest.

We shall continue to be concerned

that broadcasters be responsive to the public. (1011)
The Commission also noted the importance of the citizenry
to help monitor the progress of deregulation:
We continue to encourage citizens to meet with their local
broadcasters to discuss their concerns, but if they do not
receive satisfaction, they should take the complaint or
petition to deny routes. (1011)
Given all the above, the Commission wrote, "These long standing
channels will allow the Commission to continue to monitor the
performance of licensees, and indeed will better indicate the
responsiveness of licensees than do fixed guidelines" (1011).
Those who favor the public trusteeship model often criticize
deregulation in that with the elimination of such monitoring
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devices as the programming logs, the ability of the citizenry
to watch its channels of communication is severely impaired
(e.g. Campbell, 1980).

Hagelin and Wimmer noted the increasing

need to monitor deregulation in their 1986 article, "Broadcast
Deregulation and the Administrative Responsibility to Monitor
Policy Change: An Empirical Study of the Elimination of Logging
Requirements."

In doing their background research, the authors

found, based upon a letter they received from James C. McKinney,
Chief, Mass Media Bureau, that "in the five years since the
implementation~-of-^deregulati©n--the>Xcmmissijon has not empirically
studied the impact of radio deregulation, even though Congress
has explicitly urged it to do so" (206).
Hagelin and Wimmer, in the first and one of the few empirical
studies on the effects of deregulation, tested two hypotheses:
First, whether public participation in the Commission's
processes, as measured by the number of petitions to deny
filed, has decreased since the April 3, 1981, effective
date of radio deregulation; and second, if public participation
has decreased, whether the elimination of the program logging
requirement by the radio deregulation rules has been a causal
element in the decline in public participation. (246)
To test the first hypothesis the authors searched every petition
to deny filed in the four years before, and the four years after
the effective date of radio deregulation. The petitions were
analyzed by date, ethnic diversity of the market and market size.
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To investigate the second hypothesis, the researchers gathered
data frcm the FCC on complaints filed against stations, as well
as interviewing citizen groups who regularly participated in
proceedings before the Commission.

The authors determined that

since ccmplaints are not held up to the same rigors as petitions
to deny in terms of factual evaluation of programming, they would
serve as an accurate measurement of the public's satisfaction
with the deregulated state of their markets; a measurement not
affected by the elimination of program logs as petitions to deny
are. The authors1 contention therefore, was that if complaints
had increased after deregulation, yet petitions to deny had
decreased, or stayed the same, "then the elimination of the logging
requirement quite probably has contributed to a decrease in the
Commission's processes ("processes" in this case being petitions
to deny) (clarification added)" (247-248).
Hagelin and Wimmer found that the number of petitions to
deny had decreased slightly since deregulation.

Further, even

though the decrease in petitions to deny had decreased only
slightly, "the decline is striking when compared to the number
of citizens' complaints filed with the Conmission during
approximately the same time period" (256).

The research showed

an increase in complaints concerning racial, ethnic and religious
stereotypes, inadequate programming for minority groups, as well
as ccmplaints regarding programming in general and programming
of specific stations.

Based on these findings, the authors state
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that if petitions to deny are not hindered (by such actions as
the elimination of logging requirements), "petitions and complaints
would follow similar patterns.

Because they do not, Hagelin

and Wimmer posit:
The increase in the total volume of complaints coupled with
a decrease in the volume of petitions to deny since
deregulation implies that the public is not satisfied with
the market, but is unable to express its dissatifaction

^
(

through filing petitions to deny because of increased
difficulties in the post-deregulation petitioning process.
One post-deregulation change in the petitioning process
is the elimination of the program logging requirement. (256)
In his unpublished thesis, Radio Deregulation and the Public
Interest in the Omaha Market, Hancock (1988) examined the compliance
of radio station licensees in the Omaha, Nebraska market to the
Commission1s requirements as to the state of the public file.
Hancock defined compliance as "the presence in the public file
of the required quarterly issues/programs lists along with the
methodology used to determine which issues affected the community
of license" (41).
Hancock found a range of ccmpliance among 14 stations he
studied in the market, from total ccmpliance to non-compliance.
The author categorized his findings into three "levels": "Level
one" or total ccmpliance, where stations provided an issues/programs
list and the methodology on how the list was determined; "level

^
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two," in which the stations "provided the required information
but did not label it" (46), meaning that compliance had to be
deduced; and finally, non-compliance, stations which "made no
documented effort to ccmply with the public file requirements"
(46).
Hancock concluded that while the level of compliance was
mixed, the public files actually provided little help in determining
whether broadcasters were operating in the public interest (63-64).
Further, he suggested that the public file should have a broader
purpose:
A public file serves the public interest only if it encourages
programming that informs the listeners of issues and problems
that affect their community...The findings of the study
revealed little about licensee efforts to broadcast in the
public interest and less about the market the licensees
were in. (68)
Hemenway (1986) discussed whether the amount of
"non-entertainment" programming had changed since deregulation
in his 1986 dissertation, Philadelphia Commercial Radio Before
and After Deregulation: A Time-Series Case Study of
Non-Entertainment Programming in the Nation's Fourth Market.
Hemenway utilized the Campbell and Stanley time-series design
to conduct an a posteriori examination of programming on 23
Philadelphia radio stations before and after deregulation.1
To obtain pre-deregulation data, Hemenway relied on FCC station

Deregulation

23
license renewal applications.

Due to the license renewal pattern

of three years between applications, which was the procedure
until deregulation, he collected data spanning twelve years (or
four application periods).

Post-deregulation data was gathered

during a Spring 1985 market survey of the same stations whose
pre-deregulation programming was reviewed.
An analysis was then conducted based on comparisons of
pre-deregulation programming percentages provided by license
renewal applications, to percentages calculated from the 1985
market survey.

Because the author defined "non-entertainment

programming" as "all programs classified by individual radio
stations broadcasting those programs as either news, public affairs
or 'other non-entertainment programs'" (130-131), the percentage
breakdowns followed those three categories.
In the final analysis of his research, Hemenway found:
Scheduled commerical radio non-entertainment programming
in the Philadelphia market has changed in the wake of
deregulation.

Much of this change appears to have directly

resulted from the freedom provided by deregulation's passage.
(396)
The total amount of news and public service announcements in
the market was found to have dropped significantly between 1981
and 1985.

However, the trend appears, according to Hemenway,

to be significantly driven by station "formats."

For example,

the research indicates FM music stations are programming
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significantly lower levels of non-entertainment programming now
than before deregulation (the average total non-entertainment
programming level in 1985 was 17 percent below the FCC's previously
established level for FM stations).

At the same time, it was

found that AM stations showed an increase in levels of public

/
f

affairs programming, a trend Hemenway posits began in the 1970's
as AM stations began seeing a deterioration of their audiences
to typically music-driven FM stations.
The research points to the possiblity of a causal relationship
between deregulation of radio broadcasting and the level of
non-entertainment programming.

However, one matter can be said

to be apparent: the public has no evidence of whether or not
its interests are being served by the radio broadcasters today.
Hemenway, in his concluding remarks, suggests that this indifference
may, at least in part., have to do with

attitudes toward the

medium itself:
The dearth of radio research seems to have been lost on
most of the scholarly community, who have turned their
attention to the latest broadcast novelties— cable television,
satellite transmission, and the like.

It is not that radio

has only recently fallen from favor, nor that this disfavor
has been limited to those within the academic community.
One media critic has lamented, "The networks, national
advertisers and, presumably, the public has eloped with
a brazen but seductive hussy called television, and radio

\^ f

/
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suddenly became an abandoned orphan."

Radio, in general,

as a thoroughly integrated yet overlooked institution in
contemporary American life, merits much more of our attention.
Non-entertainment programming in particular demands the
attention of all within the radio industry responsible
for managing the use of a trusted public resource. (405)
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Statorient of Purpose

In view of the concern expressed about deregulation of the
radio and television industries before and after it became reality,
it was interesting to learn that so little research has been
done to monitor broadcasters' usage of the electronic media.
As shown by the literature review, the Federal Communications
Commission, even when prodded to do so by the Congress of the
United States, has, for unexplained reasons, chosen not to take
on this task.

Further, the citizenry (including communications

researchers), Called upon for support in this endeavor in the
"Report and Order", has also chosen, for the most part, to do
the same.
If, in fact, there were negative aspects to the deregulation
of the radio broadcasting industry, and if the public were not
being served, the Commission has said in its "Report and Order"
that it would remedy the situation.

As previously stated, one

of the areas in which deregulation has made sweeping changes
is the elimination of commercial guidelines.
has been reported in this area.

To date, no research

This is especially significant

in that the Commission intended citizen complaints to provide
the basis for monitoring policy:
The Commission in general will not be concerned with isolated
incidents of stations with high levels of commercialization.
If, however, there tends to be a pattern of serious abuse
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among certain classes of stations, the Commission could
revisit the area through an inquiry or rulemaking proceeding.
(1011)

To this end, this paper will empirically address the following
research question: Has deregulation precipitated an increase
in the amount of advertising aired by radio stations?
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Methodology

In order to determine the current levels of advertising
aired by commercial radio stations, it is necessary to obtain
representative data directly.

No public records exist.

The

Federal Communications Commission has no empirical data and radio
station executives are not obligated to provide documentation.
The standard for maximum commercial material aired within
any one hour of radio programming prior to deregulation was 18
minutes.

In defending the call for the elimination of commercial

guidelines, the Commission, as well as the marketplace model
advocates, stated that broadcasters were actually airing far
less than the maximum prior to deregulation.

Included in the

documentation of the 1979 "Notice and Inquiry" was a sample of
stations in large, medium and small markets taken from the composite
week programming logs provided by stations in compliance with
license renewal procedures; this documentation indicated that
the average number of ccmmercial seconds per broadcast hour was
below the 18 minute standard.

Three of the tables from this

study are included in the Appendix of this paper.
In contructing the experimental design of this research,
it was useful to recall the Commission's plea in the 1981 "Report
and Order," calling for public assistance in the monitoring of
the airwaves to insure that broadcasters were not taking unfair
advantage of the removal of maximum limits on commercialization:
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Citizens' ccmplaints will also provide the basis for monitoring
commercialization policy.

Although there will be some

additional burden placed on citizens to undertake such
monitoring, in fact highest levels of commercialization
tend to occur during predictably peak hours and therefore
the burden is not overwhelming. (1011)
The heaviest concentration of ccmmercial seconds per hour occurs,
logically, during those hours when radio stations have the largest
available audience.

Traditionally, and supported by the data

shown in the Appendix, morning drive time (6 a.m. to ILO a.m.)
has the largest available audience and the highest percentage
of commercials. Morning drive hours are then followed by afternoon
drive (3 p.m. to 7 p.m.).

Further, the days of the week which

tend to carry the highest commercial loads are Wednesday through
Friday, probably due to high advertiser demand. It follows,
then, that if overcommercialization was to be found, the hours
of 6 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. to 7 p.m., Wednesday through
Friday should be monitored.
Market size was another variable considered.

In the "Comments"

section of the "Report and Order," the question of whether
overcommercialization occurred more often in small markets, due
to the fewer number of stations which typically exist in those
markets, was raised (1103-1104).

While the FCC statistics (as

well as statistics gathered by the National Association of
Broadcasters) tend to indicate that "in neither the small nor
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the large markets do the stations even ccme close to the 18 minute
per hour (1080 second) guideline," commentators were not all
in agreement (1103-1104).

Given the marketplace model, however,

where competition in a market tends to keep broacasters from
taking advantage of the elimination of ccmmercial guidelines,
it did seen reasonable that the size of the market, and the number
of stations therein, should be considered in the experimental
design.
Ratings (as measured by independent research companies)
are critical to the success of broadcasters operating stations
in markets where research is conducted.

The Arbitron Ratings

Company (a division of Control Data Corporation) is the largest
and most widely used of all ratings services in radio.

Advertisers

use the information gathered and compiled by Arbitron to determine
the cost-effectiveness of a schedule of commercial announcements
on a given station in a given market.

It seemed logical, then,

that if overccmmercialization is an effect of deregulation, those
stations with high audience levels, as reflected by rating service
sources like Arbitron, should be considered in the design of
research investigating overccmmercialization.
A station which offers its market and its potential advertisers
the only means to reach a specialized audience may also be highly
sought after by the advertising community, regardless of the
size of its audience (i.e. ratings).

For example, if a licensee

has the only country music station in a market, that licensee
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may well be in an excellent postiiton to run as many commercials
as can be sold because, regardless of the ratings, if an advertiser
felt that a country audience was desirable, there would be only
one place to reach that audience.

Therefore, those stations

which are format-exclusive to a market, even if their ratings
are low, should be considered in research investigating
overcommercialization.
The final independent variable which must be included in
the design is the difference.between AM and FM radio stations.
One of the chief counterprogramming strategies employed by FM
stations as they began competing with their AM competitors came
in the form of strict limitations on commercial time availabilities.
F'rom their inception, FM stations have aired fewer commercial
announcements than AM stations.

The 1981 "Report and Order"

found:
The data for FM stations show an increasing trend of
advertising time over the 1967-76 period.

The level was

still lower than for AM stations, however, and no instance
was reported of an FM station exceeding the 18 minute
guideline. (1103)
In summary then, the independent variables considered in
determining those stations to be surveyed in this research were:
the times of the day and days of the week (per the Cocrmission's
report that there exist "predictably peak hours" where the "highest
levels of commercialization tend to occur"); the size of the
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market, in that smaller markets tend to have fewer stations,
and therefore tend to have reduced competition; a station's audience
size, as determined by Arbitron in those markets where rating
research is conducted; a station's format, in that if a station
is format-exclusive to a market, it would be surveyed even if
that station fell below the aforementioned threshhold for ratings
dominance; and finally, whether a station is AM or FM.
Five stations in the medium-sized market of Cmaha, Nebraska,
were selected by the following criteria: The two highest rated
FM stations, as determined by a one-year average of Arbitron
Ratings Service surveys (a total of four surveys), and the two
highest rated AM stations were selected for monitoring.

Further,

because there existed only one news-talk radio station in Omaha
at the time of this study, this station was monitored even though
its ratings were below the established criteria.

Each of the

stations was tape recorded during the following periods:
July 15 to August 31, 1989
September 1 to October 15, 1989
November 24 to December 25, 1989
Each of the selected stations was taped sometime between the
hours of 6 a.m. and 10 a.m., and 3 p.m. and 7 p.m., Wednesdays
through Fridays.

Each station was monitored a total of 15 hours

during the course of the research, or a total of 75 hours for
the Omaha market.
The same research was conducted in representative small
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markets in Nebraska.

Utilizing the same selection criteria and

during the same time periods and times of the year, stations
in the following markets were monitored:
Lexington, Nebraska
Lincoln, Nebraska
Plattsmouth, Nebraska
Nebraska City, Nebraska
Once the data were gathered, the total number of seconds
per hour were tabulated by: station; format; whether the station
was AM or FM; time of the day; day of the week; week of the year;
market size; and market.

Caimercial material was considered

to be any announcement ten seconds or longer, and having a clearly
identified sponsor. 2
Over 200 hours of radio content was tape recorded over the
five months of data collection.

From this, 195 usable hours,

representing 13 stations in five markets, were played back and
the total ccmmercial time as defined above was determined and
tablulated.

The integrity of the unit "hour" was determined

by the top of the hour network newscast if the station utilized
such, or a separate clock (synchronized to the NBC News Network)
to insure consistency across all stations.
Omaha, Nebraska, is the largest city in the state with a
population of 349,230 according to the 1989 Nebraska Statistical
Handbook (26), and an Arbitron market rank of 70 (Arbitron, 1989,
p. vii). Five of the 15 stations in Omaha were chosen for this
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research: KFAB-AM, the leading AM station in the market and overall
ratings leader employing an adult contemporary (AC) format, with
a heavy news and sports commitment; WOW-AM, the number two AM
in Omaha, and the only country music station (other than its
co-owned FM, with which it participates in a partial simulcast) ;
KQKQ-FM, the number one EM in Omaha, with the market's only
contemporary hit radio (CHR) format? KEZO-FM, the number two
FM in the market, and the only station with an album oriented
rock (AOR) format; and finally KKAR-AM, Omaha's only news-talk
station.
Lincoln, Nebraska, is the second largest city in the state,
but has a population of only 183,050 (Nebraska Department of
Economic Development, 1989, p. 25), and an Arbitron rank of 168
(Arbitron, 1989, p. vii).

Lincoln has virtually the same number

of stations as Cmaha (12), conceivably creating a tremendously
competitive environment.

Again, using the same criteria, five

stations were selected to be surveyed: KFOR-AM, the leading AM
station, with an AC format and strong news and sports programming;
KLIN-AM, Lincoln's number two AM (although ranked tenth in the
market overall), and while identifying themselves as a news station
on the air, music was monitored during several of the surveyed
hours; KFRX-FM, the market's top rated station programming a
CHR format; KFMQ-FM, the number two FM in Lincoln with an AOR
format; and finally, KZKX-FM, having the exclusive country format
in Lincoln.
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Three stations were selected to represent the very small
markets in the state: KRVN-AM, Lexington; KOTD-AM, Plattsmouth;
and KNCY-AM, Nebraska City.

Each of these markets is either

a single station market, or one in which an FM station is
co-owned and partially or fully simulcasts its AM programming.
Further, each of these markets is under 7,000 in population
(Nebraska Department of Economic Development, 1989, pp. 25-26),
and none of them is surveyed by Arbitron.

In terms of format,

each of the stations tended to employ basically the same style
of programming.

Music, typically of mixture of country and AC,

was kept to a minimum, and each had an emphasis on news (especially
local), sports and information. Each of the stations was a major
network affiliate, and all carried both network newscasts and
network features.
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Results

The results of the study show that in the 150 hours surveyed
in the two largest markets, Omaha and Lincoln, the commercial
seconds all fell under the established limit of 1080 seconds
(18 minutes) prior to deregulation.

Data frcm the Omaha market

are shown in Table 1, while Table 2 reflects the data gathered
in Lincoln.
The findings in the 45 hours monitored in the three smaller,
non-competitve markets show that two of the three stations surveyed
did exceed the 1080 second per hour pre-deregulation standard;
one of those stations did so only once, the other three times
(or 20 percent of the hours studied).

Results for the Lexington,

Nebraska City, and Plattsraouth, Nebraska, markets are shown in
Table 3.
The literature bemoans the fact that deregulation did away
with critical documentation the public was said to have relied
upon to monitor radio station licensees.

Through the process

of data gathering in this study, the reliance upon documentation
supplied by radio licensees to the FCC— as was the practice prior
to deregulation— canes into question.

It is possible that this

reliance may have been an ineffective methodology.

It certainly

seems so when considering monitoring carmercial material.
It was particularly interesting to observe the length of
commercials in their individual units (in this case, the unit
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of a single ccmmercial message). Using a stopwatch which was
calibrated to show one-hundredths of a second, few, if any, of
the commercials came out to the "standard" lengths of 10, 30
or 60 seconds, and it is not reasonable to expect than to do
so.

However, when monitoring the length of a "live" ccmmercial

(one in which the announcer reads the copy live and often "ad
libs"), the possibility of radio station personnel properly and
accurately monitoring and reporting the actual length of commercials
is highly suspect.

It is worthwhile to note that in each case

where a station exceeded the pre-deregulatory standard of 18
minutes per hour, the radio station aired several live commercials,
some of which were, by design, intended to run longer than a
typical 30- or 60-second ccmmercial.

These points are illustrated

in the case of the Nebraska City station, which aired over 20
minutes of ccmmercial material in one of the monitored hours.
During this hour, a local real estate agent literally read off
his listings for six and a half minutes.

At one point during

the course of this ccmmercial, the agent indicated that this
programming was scheduled for five minutes.

During another hour,

the station's ccmmercial material came very close to the 1080
second previous standard, and included within that hour was a
live commercial for an automobile dealership which ran over two
minutes.

It seems reasonable that these occurrences, should

they have happened prior to deregulation, may have gone unnoticed
if there was only the reliance only upon station documentation.

Deregulation

38
With the direct approach of gathering data advocated here, these
limitations are eliminated, and the researcher has the comfort
of maximum control.
The findings from the Lexington market reflect the highest
average commercial seconds per hour of any of the radio stations
monitored, and the station which exceeded the previous 18 minute
standard most often.

Interestingly enough, even given the extremely

high commercialization of the station (over 24 minutes of
commercials in one of the monitored hours), it is possible the
high commercial load would have gone unnoticed in the days before
deregulation (when it would have been open to sanction).
During each of the hours the station exceeded 1080 seconds, a
series of "auction" messages aired.

The announcer would either

read live copy about an auction in the area, or play a pre-recorded
tape of information about an auction and play all of these auction
messages back-to-back.

One of these sessions went on for over

nine minutes. 3 With all of the live copy involved, it would
be difficult to prepare a commercial log which would accurately
reflect the actual time involved to read all of this information.
In that the marketplace model is driven by free market
competition, it seems important to note the fact that of the
13 radio stations in the five Nebraska markets that were surveyed,
the two stations which were found to have crossed the
pre-deregulation standard of 18 minutes per hour were in small
markets which had only one station (or at most, a partially
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simulcast, co-owned and operated FM station).

This runs contrary

to the findings of the FCC in the aforementioned studies taken
from the composite logs which stations previously provided the
Commission as part of the license renewal application process
prior to deregulation.
The variable of a station's format is noteworthy in those
markets in which the listener and advertiser have a choice.
Consistent with the findings of the Commission, FM stations,
regardless of their relative advantage in the ratings, continue
to carry fewer commercial seconds than AM stations.

Given the

news and information emphasis most AM stations have, regardless
of their music format (if the station airs any music at all),
it should be noted that much of the information product is often
generated by an outside source (e.g. a radio network).

Therefore,

the station is obligated to air those commercials the network
carries.

This is important in that news-talk stations tend to

air more national ccmmercials, for which they are compensated
at relatively low dollars (and sometimes not at all), tending
to force up their total ccmmercial seconds. This is also mentioned
because it would be fallacious to assume that, because one station
is airing more commercials than another, that station is necessarily
in a better financial position— even in the simple terms of revenue
generation— than the other.

Further, in the case of the two

markets in Nebraska with news-talk formats present, those radio
stations are format exclusive in their respective markets, and
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each seems to be outperforming— in terms of numbers of
commercials— other stations with better ratings.

This is a

potential aberration in the marketplace model which is, by
definition, driven by competition.
Another interesting finding in the study was the extent
to which stations in each of the markets approached the previous
standard, yet stopped just shy of it.

When consulting the Tables,

bear in mind any finding over 900 seconds is within three minutes
of the pre-deregulatory limit, and any finding over 1000 is less
than one and one-half minutes frcm exceeding that limit.

Although

any limitation on the number of minutes of ccmmercials stations
are allowed to air per hour have been swept away, do licensees
choose to adhere to this standard as a means of exhibiting good
faith for such purposes as a level of comfort for license renewal?
Do they perceive a threshhold of tolerance on the part of the
listening audience?

If the marketplace model is valid, ratings

and competitive considerations are a simple answer, but what
about those non-competitive situations such as the ones mentioned
above?
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Conclusion

This study gathered data directly by tape recording 195
actual broadcast hours of 15 Nebraska radio stations in five
markets.

Times of the day and days of the week were selected

which were determined might logically be those "predictably peak
hours" during which the highest commercialization would tend
to occur as the FCC recommended in the 1981 "Report and Order."
Of those 195 hours played back, recorded and tabulated, only
four hours were found to have exceeded the pre-deregulation standard
of 18 minutes per hour of commercials.
At first glance, it appears the industry is doing a reasonable
job of holding down overccmmercialization in these post-deregulatory
times.

There are, however, seme indications that suggest the

possibility of a contrary conclusion.
The obvious limitation of this research is that one is unable
to generalize the state of the effects of deregulation on radio
commercialization by surveying representative markets in only
one state.

There are some patterns which may be helpful to further

study of the effects of deregulation in the radio industry.
Of the three small and non-competitive markets studied during
the course of this research, two exceeded at least once the old
standard of 18 ccmmercial minutes per hour.

The one small market

station that did not exceed the previous threshhold and, in fact,
did not even ccme close, was a market which exists, at least
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geographically, in the shadow of the state's largest market.
Plattsmouth, Nebraska, is located approximately 25 miles south
of the Omaha city limits, and most Omaha stations are easily
picked up on AM and FM receivers.

While the other two small

markets receive distant signals, they are weaker signals and
the locales are geographically much more remote than Plattsmouth.
Therefore, it can be inferred by the results of this study that
the possibility exists that radio stations in small, single-station
markets may be in a good position to increase their ccmmercial
loads with little chance of interference by a regulatory body
or a threat to its license.

While larger markets are subject

to the same regulatory conditions, the competitive environment
in which they operate may draw more attention to excessive
commercialization. Only further research can infer anything
more.
Therefore, what can be gained by this study is an awareness
of the lack of research on the effects of deregulation, and a
strong recommendation for further work in this area.

Also, a

methodology has been proposed for monitoring not only the effects
upon commercialization, but on any of the four main areas affected
by deregulation: nonentertainment programming guidelines;
ascertainments; program logs; and commercialization.

This

methodology eliminates researchers' dependence on a questionable
source for accurate information: the very entity the researcher
is attempting to monitor, the broadcaster himself.

By not depending
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on the source to provide information, the study's validity is
raised by gathering the information firsthand.
Finally, radio is a tremendously pervasive medium.

Its

cost, ease of monitoring and unique program content make it a
popular and often persuasive source of entertainment and
information, especially with a younger audience.
deserves the research community's attention.

It therefore

Deregulation

44
References

An Act for the Regulation of Radio Communications and for Other
Purposes, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
The Act to Regulate Radio Communication, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
The Arbitron Company. (Spring 1989).

Radio Market Report-Lincoln.

The Arbitron Company. (Spring 1989).

Radio Market Report-Cmaha.

Bonder, Todd. (1984).
Regulation.

A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast

Federal Communications Law Journal. 36. 27-68.

Campbell, Angela J. (1980).

The F.C.C.'s Proposal to Deregulate

Is it Permissible Under the

Communications Act of 1934?

Radio:

Federal

Carcnunications Law Journal. 32. 233-268.
Chicago Tribune v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station (Cook County Cir.
Court, 111. Nov. 17, 1926).
Coase, R.H. (1959).

The Federal Communications Commission.

The Journal

of Law and Economics. 2_. 8-87.
The Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
Davis, W. Jefferson. (1929).

Radio Law. Los Angeles: Parker, Stone

& Baird Company.
Edwards, Harry T. (1984).

Judicial Review of Deregulation.

Northern

Kentucky Law Review. 11. 229-283.
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 US. 134, 138 (1940).
Fowler, Mark S. (1982).

The Public's Interest.

Communications and the

Law. _4. 51-58.
Fowler, Mark S. (1984).

The Boom Goes Bust, the Bust Goes Boom.

Deregulation

45

Communications and the Law. 6_. 23-29.
Fowler, Mark S., & Brenner, Daniel L. (1982).
to Broadcast Regulation.
Geller, Henry. (1987).

A Marketplace Approach

Texas Law Review. 60. 207-257.

Foreword.

In Stuart N. Brotman (Ed.),

The Telecommunications Deregulation Sourcebook, (vii-x).

Boston: Artech

House.
Gellhom, Ernest, & Pierce, Jr., Richard J. (1982). Regulated Industries.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co.
Ginsburg, Douglas H. (1979).

Regulation of Broadcasting: Law and Policy

Towards Radio, Television and Cable Communications. St. Paul: West
Publishing Co.
Hagelin, Theodore M., & Wimmer, Kurt A. (1986).

Broadcast Deregulation

and the Administrative Responsibility to Monitor Policy Change: An
Empirical Study of the Elimination of Logging Requirements.

Federal

Communications Law Journal. 38. 201-282.
Hancock, Robert D. (1988)

Radio Deregulation and the Public Interest

in the Omaha Market. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Nebraska,
Omaha, Nebraska.
Hemenway, Paul T. M. (1986)

Philadelphia Commercial Radio Before and

After Deregulation: A Time-Series Case Study of Non-Entertainment
Programming in the Nation's Fourth Market. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Temple University.
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Company, 286 F.1003 (1923).
In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed
Rule Making. Released: September 27, 1979. 73 FCC 2d, 457-614.

Deregulation

46
In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding
Terminated). Released: February 24, 1981. 84 FCC 2d, 968-1130.
Ingber, Stanley. (1984).

The Marketplace of Ideas: The Legitimizing Myth.

Duke Law Journal. 1-91.
Kahn, Frank J. (Ed.). (1984). Documents of American Broadcasting.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
LeDuc, Don R. (1987).

Beyond Broadcasting: Patterns in Policy and Law.

New York: Longman, Inc.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
Nebraska Department of Economic Development. (1989).

Nebraska

Statistical Handbook. Lincoln, Nebraska.
Smythe, Dallas W. (1982).

Radio Deregulation and the Relation of the

Private and Public Sectors.

Journal of Communication. 32. 192-200.

Tolchin, Susan J., and Tolchin, Martin. (1983).

Dismantling America:

The Rush to Deregulate. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Tunstall, Jeremy. (1986).

Ccnmunications Deregulation: The Unleashing

of America's Communications Industry. New York: Basil Blackwell, Inc.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131

(1948).

United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 12 F.2d 614 (D.C.111.

1926).

Deregulation

47
Footnotes

1

Hemenway1s a posteriori examination of radio station

programming before and after deregulation utilized the time-series
design developed by Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley in 1963:
The essence of the time-series design is the presence of
a periodic measurement process on some group or individual
and the introduction of an experimental change into this
time series of measurements, the results of which are indicated
by a discontinuity in the measurements recorded in the time
series.

It can be diagrammed thus:
0000X0000

(as cited in Hemenway, 1986, p.114)
2

To ensure consistency across all stations monitored,

public service announcements, station promotional messages of
special programming or contests were not considered "commercials."
3

The station was contacted to ensure that the auction

segments were paid commercial announcements rather than unpaid
announcements offered for public service.
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Table 1

1989 Radio Monitor Report-Qmaha Market (FM Stations)
Station: KQKQ-FM

Station: KEZO-FM

Format: CHR

Format: AOR

Arbitron rank: #1 FM

Arbitron rank: #2 FM

Week

Daypart

Seconds

Week

Daypart

Seconds

1

PMD

505

1

PMD

386

1

PMD

532

1

AMD

572

1

AMD

531

1

AMD

671

2

AMD

544

2

AMD

552

2

AMD

608

2

AMD

505

2

AMD

628

2

AMD

603

2

AMD

640

2

AMD

569

2

PMD

507

2

AMD

578

2

PMD

687

2

PMD

618

3

AMD

562

3

AMD

582

3

AMD

533

3

AMD

685

3

AMD

539

3

PMD

549

3

AMD

567

3

AMD

653

3

PMD

500

3

AMD

565

3

AMD

571

3

AMD

672

average: 564 sec.
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am)
AOR=album oriented rock
Week 1: Jul.-Aug.

average: 584 sec.
PMD=Aftemoon drive (3-7pm)
CHR=contemporary hit radio

Week 2: Sept.-Oct.

Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 2

1989 Radio Monitor Report-Qmaha Market (AM Stations)
Station: KFAB-AM

Station: WOW-AM

Station: KKAR-AM

Format: AC

Format: Country

Format: News-Talk

Arbitron rank: #1 AM

Arbitron rank: #2 AM

Arbitron rank: N/A*

Week Daypart Seconds

Week Daypart Seconds

Week Daypart Seconds

1

AMD

428

1

AMD

770

1

AMD

834

1

AMD

568

1

AMD

612

1

AMD

863

1

PMD

509

1

PMD

931

1

PMD

830

1

PMD

510

1

PMD

726

1

PMD

832

1

AMD

583

2

PMD

784

1

AMD

500

1

AMD

588

2

PMD

588

1

AMD

597

2

AMD

900

2

PMD

708

2

AMD

589

2

PMD

641

2

AMD

828

2

PMD

668

2

- AMD

843

2

AMD

745

2

PMD

843

2

AMD

613

3

PMD

837

2

PMD

738

2

AMD

659

3

PMD

634

2

AMD

580

3

PMD

674

3

AMD

635

3

AMD

1072

3

PMD

828

3

AMD

688

3

AMD

714

3

AMD

744

3

AMD

768

3

PMD

901

3

AMD

611

3

PMD

425

3

PMD

1077

average: 647 sec.

average: 732 sec.

AMD=Morning drive (6-10am)
AC=adult contemporary
Week 1: Jul.-Aug.

average: 776 sec.

PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)

*N/A=Arbitron rank falls below #2

Week 2: Sept.-Oct.

Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 3

1989 Radio Monitor Report-Lincoln Market (FM Stations)
Station: KFRX-FM

Station: KFMQ-FM

Station: KZKX-FM

Format: CHR

Format: AOR

Format: Country

Arbitron rank: #1 FM Arbitron rank: #2 FM Arbitron rank: N/A*
Week Daypart Seconds

Week Daypart Seconds

Week Daypart Seconds

1

AMD

559

1

AMD

307

1

AMD

438

1

AMD

646

1

AMD

492

1

AMD

418

1

PMD

444

1

PMD

710

1

PMD

412

1

PMD

501

1

PMD

215

1

PMD

400

1

AMD

590

1

AMD

517

1

AMD

440

1

AMD

625

1

AMD

510

1

AMD

446

2

PMD

541

2

AMD

590

2

AMD

422

2

AMD

657

2

AMD

421

2

AMD

565

2

AMD

525

2

PMD

401

2

AMD

638

2

PMD

500

2

AMD

557

2

AMD

476

3

AMD

599

2

PMD

596

2

PMD

580

3

AMD

600

3

AMD

678

2

PMD

507

3

PMD

480

3

AMD

662

3

AMD

786

3

AMD

596

3

AMD

626

3

AMD

514

3

AMD

601

3

PMD

867

3

AMD

449

average: 543 sec.

average: 564 sec.

AMD=Morning drive (6-10am)
AOR=album oriented rock
Week 1: Jul.-Aug.

average: 499 sec.

PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)

CHR=contemporary hit radio

Week 2: Sept.-Oct. Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 4

1989 Radio Monitor Report-Lincoln Market (AM Stations)
Station.: KFOR-AM

Station: KLIN-AM

Format: AC

Format: News

Arbitron rank: #1 AM

Arbitron rank: #2 AM

Week

Daypart

Seconds

Week

Daypart

Seconds

1

AMD

862

1

AMD

594

1

AMD

904

1

AMD

533

1

PMD

777

1

PMD

510

1

PMD

780

2

AMD

710

1

PMD

725

2

AMD

597

2

AMD

932

2

PMD

430

2

AMD

827

2

PMD

668

2

PMD

832

2

PMD

566

2

PMD

831

2

PMD

536

3

AMD

894

3

AMD

871

3

AMD

856

3

AMD

510

3

PMD

857

3

PMD

794

3

PMD

904

3

PMD

613

3

AMD

857

3

AMD

526

3

PMD

858

3

PMD

819

average: 846 sec.
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am)

average: 618 sec.
PMI>=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)

AG=adult contemporary
Week 1: Jul. Aug.

Week 2: Sept.-Oct.

Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 5
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Small Nebraska Markets (Non-Arbitron)
Station: KRVN-AM

Station: KNCY-AM

Station: KOTD-AM

Market: Lexington

Market: Nebraska City Market: Plattsmouth

Format: AC

Format: AC

Week Daypart Seconds

Week Daypart Seconds

Format: AC
Week Daypart Seconds

1

PMD

991

1

AMD

380

1

AMD

382

1

PMD

833

1

AMD

1211

1

AMD

271

1

AMD

1309

1

AMD

587

1

PMD

716

1

AMD

1018

1

AMD

278

1

PMD

102

1

AMD

1190

1

AMD

462

1

AMD

257

2

AMD

1457

1

AMD

290

1

AMD

285

2

AMD

1035

2

PMD

500

2

AMD

293

2

AMD

1052

2

AMD

1019

2

AMD

300

2

PMD

1052

2

AMD

577

2

AMD

302

2

PMD

940

2

AMD

296

2

PMD

196

2

PMD

1076

2

PMD

401

2

PMD

181

3

PMD

763

3

PMD

476

3

PMD

196

3

PMD

486

3

PMD

474

3

PMD

125

3

PMD

784

3

PMD

618

3

PMD

161

3

PMD

737

3

PMD

464

3

PMD

217

average: 981 sec.

average: 536 sec.

average: 240 sec.

AMD=Morning drive (6-10am)

PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)

AC=adult contemporary

18 minutes=1080 seconds

Week 1: Jul.-Aug.

Week 2: Sept.-Oct.

Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Appendix A

572

Federal Communications Commission Reports
Table 14A: Average Number of Commercial Seconds per Broadcast
Hour, Sample of Stations in Large, Medium, and Small Markets,
Georgia and Alabama
Hour
ending:

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thur.

Fri.

S at

Sun.

1:00 am
2:00 am
3:00 am
4:00 am
5:00 am
6 .*00 am
7:00 am
8:00 am
9:00 am
10:00 am
11:00 am
12:00 n
1:00 pm
2:00 pm
3:00 pm
4:00 pm
5:00 pm
6:00 pm
7:00 pm
8:00 pm
9:00 pm
10:00 pm
11:00 pm
12:00 pm

70.9
3.0
0.0
0.0
9.0
788
431.3
529.9
476.1
394.8
356.5
428.6
404.7
343.7
376.3
395.9
441.9
410.3
3282.
229.5
179.0
163.6
145.0
58.1

95.5
105.0
121.4
89.5
722
169.7
532.2
600.5
519.8
454.6
3462
361.7
391.5
364.9
329.7
408.7
4883
461.0
373.6
267.9
238.5
290.8
191.5
84.1

36.8
43.3
17.5
27.5
39.2
175.3
531.3
675.1
566.8
458.3
387.9
447.7
491.6
445.3
425.1
489.4
562.7
545.7
391.7
344.4
297.1
254.0
205.5
145.7

137.3
140.7
94.3
87.7
126.6
2382
525.0
726.6
656.3
622.6
538.4
518.6
555.5
5702
562.6
607.0
642.8
644.7
582.5
537.1
471.4
324.5
279.0
207.0

135.4
101.6
89.1
782
95.5
1672
555.0
735.0
681.6
5442
4662
519.0
5632
5180
514.0
6383
7089
650.7
550.4
4180
3552
340.0
289.4
2280

17.5
383
34.6
286
188
53.4
1862
251.7
279.4
285.5
2772
289.3
3380
2981
274.3
254.1
314.1
189.8
133.9
133.3
231.9
1286
121.5
602

642
67.5
585
67.5
592
77.8
107.1
1432
158.9
168.7
179.4
80.5
216.7
2588
261.8
2587
245.1
243.4
2232
1452
1982
149.9
129.7
87.7

Source: Composite Week Logs Provided by Stations w ith License Renewal
Applications.
For each station, data were used fo r one day of the week.
The markets included in this sample are all the markets listed
in Table 18.
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Deregulation of Radio

573

Table 14B: Average Number of Commercial Seconds per
B roadcast Hour, Sample of Stations in Large and
Medium Sized Markets. Georgia and Alabama
Hour
Ending

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

F it

S at

Sun.

1:00 am
2:00 am
3:00 am
4:00 am
5:00 am
6:00 am
7:00 am
8:00 am
9:00 am
10:00 am
11:00 am
12:00 n
1:00 pm
2:00 pm
3:00 pm
4:00 pm
5:00 pm
6:00 pm
7:00 pm
8:00 pm
9:00 pm
10:00 pm
11:00 pm
12:00 pm

69.0
3.3
0.0
0.0
9.0
71.8
380.2
461.7
435.5
3432
296.7
381.9
301.9
333.7
331.4
394.5
41L2
389.8
369.4
227.5
195.6
180.6
123.8
45.0

95.5
105.0
121.4
89.5
722
205.2
550.8
6532
588.5
524.4
400.8
390.0
436.8
401.8
367.5
490.8
540.5
508.5
413.5
275.5
275.0
314.6
2062
93.1

33.0
49.0
18.0
30.0
38.0
138.0
538.6
656.9
601.1
477.6
388.4
433.7
4582
447.6
422.9
521.1
548.7
518.4
404.7
366.3
3012
2782
221.8
146.4

142.1
140.7
90.0
83.6
127.1
206.0
520.9
680.5
635.0
543.9
479.1
4742
476.8
490.5
479.8
557.7
581.8
565.8
5802
503.1
464.7
348.8
278.8
232.6

135.5
94.5
80.0
68.0
81.0
142.1
566.0
738.8
6752
544.0
467.0
4952
506.0
464.8
495.0
634.0
698.9
6572
6192
498.6
3922
3542
3232
2625

20.4
35.0
37.5
28.8
15.0
47.3
150.0
203.1
277.5
286.9
250.0
256.7
3422
323.9
277.5
271.4
33L1
185.0
157.3
168.8
158.1
1532
124.6
70.0

642
67.5
52.5
67.5
592
21.5
72.9
104.5
121.8
1582
157.6
109.6
229.8
237.9
249.8
267.9
265.6
257.4
2323
150.6
153.1
87.5
81.6
61.3

Source: Composite week logs provided by stations w ith License Renewal
Applications.
For each station, data were used fo r one day of the week.
The markets included in this sample are the firs t 14 markets
listed in Table 18.
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Federal Communications Commission Reports
Table 14C: Average Number of Commercial Seconds Per
Broadcast Hour, Sample of Stations in Medium
Small Markets, Georgia and Alabama
Hour
Ending
1:00 am
2:00 am
3:00 am
4:00 am
5:00 am
6:00 am
7:00 am
8:00 am
9:00 am
10:00 am
11:00 am
12:00 n
1:00 pm
2:00 pm
3:00 pm
4:00 pm
5:00 pm
6:00 pm
7:00 pm
8:00 pm
9:00 pm
10:00 pm
11:00 pm
12:00 pm

Mon.
90.0
0.0

Tues.

-

-

-

-

-

-

90.0
538.7
660.0
5532
4932
470.6
517.7
601.0
3622
462.0
398.6
5002
4532
19L0
240.0
4622
2722
315.0
1622

-

63.0
338.5
495.0
382.5
315.0
237.0
305.0
SOLO
291.0
254.0
244.5
366.0
366.0
285.0
250.0
170.7
229.0
143.8
55.0

Wed.

Thun.

Fri.

Sat.

Sun.

462
15.0
15.0
15.0
45.0
250.0
518.1
707.9
5012
4212
386.9
4742
555.0
440.9
4292
4292
5892
597.6
3682
306.9
287.0
195.6
169.6
1442

70.0
140.0
155.0
145.0
120.0
3582
535.1
8392
7082
815.1
683.3
626.9
7472
765.0
727.4
7912
819.9
5852
690.0
500.0
5072
221.0
380.0
6L7

135.0
180.0
180.0
180.0
240.0
320.0
530.6
7272
6942
574.5
4632
5662
678.5
6092
552.0
632.0
710.8
6362
4122
238.9
270.0
306.0
208.0
80.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
80.0
268.1
3482
2832
2822
33L7
354.4
ftggft
240.6
2672
219.4
280.0
200.0
882
562
39L7
64.0
1112
2B2

810.0
190.0
235.0
246.9
1982
2312
112
185.6
284.4
2872
220.6
20L7
210.0
208.1
60.0
920.0
1080.0
900.0
510.0

Source: Composite Week Logs provided by stations w ith License Renewal
Applications.
For each station, data were used for one day of the week.
means no programming broadcast in those hours.
The markets included in this sample are all the markets listed
in Table 18 with the exception o f the firs t 14 markets listed.
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